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The Prosecution of Local Nazi Collaborators 
in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: 
A Squandered Opportunity to Confront 
Holocaust Crimes 
EFRAIM ZUROFF 
Any attempt to assess the efforts to prosecute Holocaust perpetra-
tors in post-Communist societies must begin by delineating three im-
portant historical phenomena which had an extremely significant influ-
ence on the attempts to bring Nazi war criminals to justice in Eastern 
Europe and on the perceptions of the Holocaust in these countries. 
The first phenomenon relates to the unique role played by Eastern 
European Nazi collaborators in the implementation of the Final Solu-
tion. In all the countries occupied by, or allied with, the Third Reich, lo-
cal collaborators assisted the Nazis in implementing their anti-Jewish 
policies, but the role played by collaborators in many Eastern European 
countries was particularly extensive and uniquely lethal. Thus while the 
Nazis’ local helpers in the rest of Europe assisted them in implementing 
all the preliminary stages of the Final Solution (definition, Aryanization, 
concentration and deportation), those collaborators were never called 
upon to carry out the systematic mass murder of the Jews, which was 
committed hundreds of kilometers away in Eastern Europe, with the ac-
tive participation of numerous local collaborators. 
The second important historical phenomenon, which affected the 
issue of the prosecution of Holocaust perpetrators in Eastern Europe, 
was the numerous trials of local Nazi collaborators conducted by the 
Soviet or Communist judicial authorities in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II. In theory, such a large number of trials (whose exact 
number remains unknown to this day) should have clearly revealed the 
significance and scope of the role played by local residents in the mass 
murders. The Communists’ manipulation of postwar justice for propa-
ganda purposes, however, delegitimized the trials in the eyes of the lo-
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cal population. The most blatant flaws in the process were the exagger-
ated emphasis on the murder of Communists, the downplaying of Jew-
ish victimhood and the preference given to prosecution for political 
crimes rather than for genuine war crimes. 
Needless to say, these problematic practices were also replicated 
when it came to erecting monuments and writing historical accounts and 
textbooks. Thus under Communism, World War II was primarily por-
trayed as an ideological struggle between anti-fascists and bourgeois 
capitalist nationalists. Under such circumstances, even those trials in 
which Holocaust perpetrators were prosecuted for the killing of Jews, 
did not necessarily convey an accurate narrative of the events. 
In addition, many of the major local Nazi war criminals responsi-
ble for the mass murder of Jews escaped to Western democracies, out of 
Soviet reach, and their prosecution in absentia and/or the accusations 
leveled against them in Soviet publications were often perceived pri-
marily as part of the Soviet campaigns against the West, rather than the 
pursuit of justice. Thus it becomes clear that during the postwar Com-
munist domination of the region, the peoples of Eastern Europe who 
had participated in Holocaust crimes, never had a real opportunity to 
confront the active participation of their nationals in these atrocities. 
Under those circumstances, the third phenomenon, the discovery 
of large numbers of Eastern European Holocaust perpetrators living in 
the United States and their successful prosecution for emigration and 
naturalization violations, presented a golden opportunity to bring to trial 
numerous Nazi collaborators and to help inform the public, especially in 
Eastern Europe, of the important role played by local residents in the 
implementation of the Final Solution. The results achieved to date by 
the U.S. Office of Special Investigations (“OSI”) (currently the Human 
Rights and Special Prosecutions Section of the American Department of 
Justice) have been extremely impressive. As of June 1, 2016, the Amer-
icans have won cases against 108 Nazi war criminals, with eighty-six 
being stripped of their US citizenship and sixty-seven successfully re-
moved from the country, practically all of them of Eastern European 
origin. The success of the American prosecution effort had two positive 
effects. First of all, it helped illuminate the highly important role played 
by local Nazi collaborators in the murder of Jews. Second, it helped 
convince Canada, Australia and Great Britain to initiate government in-
vestigations to determine whether they too had admitted Nazi war crim-
inals. Those inquiries ultimately led to the passage of laws enabling the 
criminal prosecution of Holocaust perpetrators in Canada (1987), Aus-
tralia (1989), and Great Britain (1991). 
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There were, however, three basic problems with the attempts to 
bring Nazi war criminals to justice in the United States. The first was 
that it only began in earnest in 1979 with the establishment of the OSI, 
by which time several of the most important killers had already died. 
The second problem was that due to the fact that the crimes had been 
committed overseas and that the victims were not Americans, the Unit-
ed States was forced to prosecute them on civil charges for immigration 
and/or naturalization violations, rather than on criminal charges for 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or murder. Winning 
these cases was relatively easier than in criminal prosecutions, and the 
punishments (denaturalization and deportation) were relatively lighter, 
which lessened the impact of these convictions. This problem might 
have been overcome, if those convicted could have been extradited back 
to their countries of origin to be prosecuted for their crimes, but until 
the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of Communism, this was 
totally out of the question, with the exception of two cases, those of 
Ukrainian Treblinka guard Feodor Federenko and Estonian Nazi collab-
orator Karl Linnas. In that respect, the fall of the Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe had a double effect. It made it possible for the newly-
democratic countries to seek the extradition of their nationals who had 
escaped overseas after World War II, and it created opportunities for the 
criminal prosecution of these suspects in their native countries.1 
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the transition to democracy 
did indeed have a major impact on the efforts to prosecute local Nazi 
war criminals, but any attempt to evaluate the results achieved must be 
viewed within the broader context of the response of the newly-
established governments of Central and Eastern Europe to six practical 
Holocaust-related issues which they had to face shortly after the fall of 
Communism. Only one relates directly to the prosecution of perpetra-
tors, but all ultimately proved to be interconnected: 
1. Acknowledgment of complicity by the local population in 
the murder of the Jews and an apology for those crimes 
2. Commemoration of the victims 
3. Prosecution of the perpetrators 
4. Documentation of the crimes 
5. Holocaust education 
6. Restitution of communal and individual property2 
 
 1. EFRAIM ZUROFF, OPERATION LAST CHANCE; ONE MAN’S QUEST TO BRING NAZI 
CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE 107 (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) [hereinafter OPERATION LAST CHANCE]. 
 2. Efraim Zuroff, Eastern Europe: Anti-Semitism in the Wake of Holocaust-Related Issues, 
17 JEWISH POLITICAL STUD. REV., Spring 2005, at 63–79. 
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From the outset, it is important to note that these issues assumed 
particular significance for these governments due to the common per-
ception in post-Communist Europe that “the road to Brussels and Wash-
ington goes through Jerusalem,” or in more prosaic terms, if they want-
ed to achieve their primary foreign policy objectives of NATO 
membership and entry into the European Union, they would have to es-
tablish good relations with Israel and world Jewry. It was clear from the 
outset, however, that dealing with these Holocaust-related issues would 
be an absolute prerequisite to do so, a situation that also reflected the 
growing importance of Holocaust commemoration and education in in-
ternational relations and its increasingly significant role in Jewish iden-
tity throughout the Diaspora.3 
What was obvious from the start, however, was that the issue of 
prosecution was likely to be one of the most difficult—both because of 
the fact that it was the only issue which was time-limited and due to the 
extremely strong local opposition it encountered from the beginning. 
The latter was clearly reflected by the fact that one of the first steps tak-
en by several of the new governments of Eastern Europe was a large 
scale “rehabilitation” program, under which tens of thousands of con-
victions handed down by Soviet courts were cancelled and those con-
victed were granted monetary compensation for the punishments they 
endured as well as special financial benefits. This process, although os-
tensibly limited to those punished for political crimes, in fact included 
numerous Holocaust perpetrators. When this phenomenon was revealed, 
invariably by foreign Jewish groups or researchers, the demand that the 
pardons granted to Nazi war criminals be rescinded became part and 
parcel of the campaigns in these countries to bring unprosecuted Holo-
caust perpetrators to justice.4 
The best way to illustrate these problems is to demonstrate their 
practical implications in several different countries. The country which 
prosecuted the largest number of local Nazi war criminals and in which 
this issue became particularly prominent is undoubtedly Lithuania. The 
reasons that this question became so important in that country are: 
1. The extensive scope of local complicity in the murder of 
Jews, which encompassed all strata of Lithuanian society; 
2. The relatively large number of unprosecuted suspects; 
3. The prominent role played by several of these suspects; 
 
 3. On the importance of Holocaust-related issues for the new democracies of Eastern Eu-
rope, see OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 100. 
 4. On the rehabilitations granted in Lithuania see OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, 
at 101–05. 
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4. The fact that numerous Lithuanian Nazi collaborators es-
caped after the war to the United States, where they were 
successfully prosecuted for concealing their wartime activi-
ties; and 
5. The fact that practically every Lithuanian deported from the 
United States returned to live in Lithuania (which was will-
ing to accept almost all of them), thereby increasing the 
pressure to deal with the problem.5 
Before presenting a summary of Lithuania’s efforts to prosecute 
these perpetrators, it is important to attempt to understand the public at-
titude toward the efforts to hold local war criminals accountable. There 
is no question that during the period following independence, there was 
little willingness to deal in any way with Lithuanian complicity in Hol-
ocaust crimes, let alone with practical implications like prosecution. 
Several examples in this regard will suffice. The first was the declara-
tion issued by the Lithuanian Supreme Council in May 1990 condemn-
ing “the annihilation of the Jewish people” which, although it was offi-
cially issued “on behalf of the Lithuanian people,” attributed guilt for 
the crimes to “Lithuanian citizens,” a category clearly not limited to 
ethnic Lithuanians, who were the overwhelming majority of the perpe-
trators, and which by a twist of perverted logic could even include 
Jews.6 A second was the reluctance to specifically acknowledge the par-
ticipation of Lithuanians in the crimes committed at Ponar (Paneriai), 
the site of the mass murder of the Jews of Vilna, in the inscriptions in 
Lithuanian and Russian on a new monument built on the site in 1991.7 A 
third was the speech by Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius at the 
dedication of that same monument, in which he claimed that the crimes 
against Jews lasted three months instead of three years, and that the only 
Lithuanians who participated were “a group of criminals,” even though 
local complicity in the murders was widespread and encompassed all 
strata of Lithuanian society.8 
In addition, it was relatively common to hear Lithuanian leaders 
and officials attempt to present false symmetries regarding the history 
of World War II such as, for example, that the number of Lithuanians 
 
 5. See generally RUTA VANAGAITE AND EFRAIM ZUROFF, MŪSIŠKIAI (Alma Littera 2016). 
 6. Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania Concerning the Geno-
cide of the Jewish nation in Lithuania During the Period of the Nazi Occupation, May 8, 1990, in 
SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER-ISRAEL OFFICE ARCHIVES, at Lithuania, file no. 2. 
 7. OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 99. 
 8. Adress [sic] by Gediminas Vagnorius, Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania on 
20 June 1991 at Dedication Ceremony of Monument at Ponar, in SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER-
ISRAEL OFFICE ARCHIVES, at Lithuania, file no. 3. 
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who assisted Jews during the Nazi occupation was equivalent or greater 
than the number of those who participated in Holocaust crimes. Another 
false symmetry equated crimes ostensibly committed by Jewish Com-
munists during the initial year of Soviet occupation (June 1940–June 
1941) with those carried out by local Nazi war criminals during the 
Holocaust. 
Given this mind-set, it is hardly surprising that there was almost no 
support in Lithuania to press charges against local Nazi war criminals. 
In fact, one of the first programs initiated by independent Lithuania was 
an extensive rehabilitation program for those ostensibly falsely convict-
ed by the Soviet courts. Tens of thousands of Lithuanians were granted 
pardons, monetary compensation for time in jail, and special financial 
benefits. Even though “those who had participated in genocide” were 
officially ineligible for this program, at least several dozen Nazi war 
criminals were rehabilitated. Only after extremely strong protests by Is-
rael, the United States and Jewish organizations, did the Lithuanians set 
up a joint Lithuanian-Israeli commission of inquiry and begin canceling 
the pardons granted illegally to the murderers of Jews.9 
As far as the prosecution of Holocaust perpetrators was concerned, 
the Lithuanian government could not possibly ignore this issue, for the 
numerous reasons cited above. Thus on a practical level, the arrival in 
Vilnius in the nineties of high-ranking Nazi collaborators such as Ale-
ksandras Lileikis and Kazys Gimzauskas, the commander and deputy 
commander of the Saugumas (Lithuanian Security Police) in the Vilnius 
district, both of whom were denaturalized and ordered deported from 
the United States, as well as several officers from the infamous Twelfth 
Lithuanian Auxiliary Police Battalion, virtually forced the Lithuanian 
judicial authorities to deal with this problem. Their response was to wait 
until the key suspects, who had arrived in Lithuania in good health 
(Gimzauskas in 1993 and Lileikis in 1996), became medically unfit to 
stand trial. At that point, the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) passed two 
special laws to allow genocide suspects to be investigated and indicted 
regardless of their medical condition. 
Thus both former Saugumas commanders were finally charged – 
Gimzauskas on November 20, 1997 and Lileikis on February 8, 1998 – 
but neither was ever arrested despite the severity of the charges against 
them, nor was either ever forced to appear at a single session of their 
trials. (Lileikis voluntarily appeared once for ten minutes and briefly 
followed another session by videotape.) Lileikis died in the middle of 
 
 9. OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 101–05. 
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his trial on September 26, 2000, whereas by the time Gimzauskas was 
convicted on January 14, 2001, he was unfit for punishment. Both trials 
received minimal coverage in the local media, part of which was clearly 
sympathetic to the defendants, who made every effort to emphasize 
their advanced age and frailties. If anything, the anger of parts of the 
Lithuanian public was directed primarily at those they deemed respon-
sible for forcing the prosecution of these Lithuanians, i.e. the interna-
tional Jewish organizations pressing the issue and the State of Israel.10 
In fact, these cases, the campaign to rescind the rehabilitations 
granted to Holocaust perpetrators, and subsequent efforts to prosecute 
additional Lithuanian Nazi war criminals, all became catalysts to rally 
those elements of Lithuanian society who sought to prevent any discus-
sion of the critical and extensive role played by local Nazi collaborators 
in the Holocaust. Anti-Semitic responses abounded in local Internet fo-
rums, and especially on the news portal www.delfi.lt. During this peri-
od, there were also numerous incidents of vandalization of Holocaust 
memorials and Jewish cemeteries, and demonstrations were held in Vil-
nius and elsewhere. Thus, for example, in response to the launching in 
Lithuania by the Simon Wiesenthal Center of its “Operation: Last 
Chance” project, which offers financial rewards for information which 
will facilitate the prosecution and punishment of Nazi war criminals, a 
member of the Taurage city council burned an Israeli flag in the center 
of town and drove around the city playing Nazi marches on a loud-
speaker.11 
In that respect, the efforts to bring these criminals to justice in 
Lithuania suffered primarily from the lack of any significant local sup-
port to emphasize the importance and necessity of this process. Unfor-
tunately, the local Jewish community, which in theory should have ful-
filled that role, chose to maintain a low profile due to fears of anti-
Semitism. The fact that with the exception of a few solitary intellectuals 
who supported the justice process, there was no local group of any size 
or stature willing to lobby for the prosecution, apparently convinced the 
wider public that it was dangerous to be outspoken in this regard. The 
 
 10. On the cases of Lileikis and Gimzauskas, see OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, 
at 107–10. 
 11. Taurageje surengta antisemitine akcija (trans. “An Anti-Semitic Incident Was Orga-
nized in Taurage”), LIETUVOS RYTAS, July 29, 2002, at 2 (Lithuanian); Lithuanian Politician 
Burns Israeli Flag, Plays Nazi Songs, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 29, 2002. Among the Jew-
ish sites vandalized during the period since Lithuania obtained its independence were several 
Holocaust memorial monuments, particularly in smaller communities. See, e.g., The Baltic States, 
in ANTISEMITISM WORLDWIDE 129 (Dina Porat ed., World Jewish Congress and Anti-
Defamation League 1995). 
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other potential constituency to advocate prosecution would have been 
anti-Nazi veterans and/or local anti-fascists, but neither group existed as 
such in Lithuania which, unlike most of Europe, never produced an anti-
Nazi resistance movement. As far as the Communists were concerned, 
forty-six years of Soviet occupation had totally discredited them, and 
most had become nationalists, and as such could hardly publicly advo-
cate the prosecution of Lithuanians for Nazi crimes. 
Another reflection of the deep-seated opposition in Lithuania to 
the efforts to hold local Holocaust perpetrators accountable was the de-
cision by the Lithuanian government to seek the extradition from Israel 
of two Lithuanian Jews alleged to have committed crimes against Lith-
uanians while serving in the KGB.12 And, in fact, nationalist elements 
invariably raised the cases of Nachman Dushansky and Shimon Berkov 
in response to demands by international Jewish organizations and/or the 
State of Israel to Lithuania to expedite the prosecution of Lithuanian 
Nazi war criminals.13 In this context, it is important to note that in the 
Dushansky case, twenty-five Lithuanian officers of higher or equivalent 
rank who served together with him were not even investigated, let alone 
indicted. In response, Israel took the hitherto unprecedented step of re-
fusing a Lithuanian request for judicial assistance, based on the suspi-
cion that the charges against Dushansky were motivated by anti-
Semitism.14 
It is hard to predict what kind of impact the successful prosecution 
of a high-ranking and/or particularly murderous local Holocaust perpe-
trator, conducted properly with extensive and balanced media coverage, 
might have had on Lithuanian public opinion and perceptions of the 
Shoa. What is currently clear, after twenty-five years of efforts to 
achieve that goal, is that it has hitherto not happened, nor is it likely to 
take place in the future. 
 
 12. Mel Huang, History Greets the New Year on the Baltic, 2 CENTRAL EUROPE REVIEW, 
no. 1, 2000. The individuals in question are Nachman Dushanski and Semyon Berkov. 
 13. Vasiliauskas relates that following a visit to Lithuania by this author who had submitted 
particularly damning testimony regarding the participation of Lithuanians in the murder of Jews 
in the town of Rokiskis, obtained in the framework of “Operation: Last Chance” (which featured 
special advertisements calling on individuals to volunteer information regarding the identity of 
local Nazi perpetrators), to the Lithuanian Special Prosecutor for genocide crimes, the Lithuanian 
Center for the Study of Genocide and Resistance sponsored special radio advertisements calling 
for people with information on Communist crimes in the Rokiskis area during and after World 
War II to come forward. Geoffrey Vasiliauskas, No One Rules, LAISVAS LAIKRASTIS, March 16, 
2004, at 4. 
 14. Letter of Irit Kahan, director of the Department of International Affairs of the Israeli 
Ministry of Justice to Lithuanian Prosecutor-General Kazys Pednycia, February 2, 2000, in 
ARCHIVES OF THE ISRAEL OFFICE OF THE SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER, at Lithuania, file no. 28.  
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The record of the Lithuanian judiciary to date is as follows. It 
opened dozens of pretrial investigations, only four of which resulted in 
indictments, two of which were against medically-unfit defendants ul-
timately tried in Vilnius and a third, which was the basis for a request to 
Scotland for the extradition of Antony Gecas or Antanas Gecevičius, an 
officer of the infamous Twelfth Lithuanian Auxiliary Police Battalion 
was rejected due to his ill health. Thus only one trial was conducted 
with a defendant physically present in the docket, the March 2006 trial 
of Saugumas operative Algimantas Dailide, who was among the numer-
ous Lithuanians successfully prosecuted in the US by the Office of Spe-
cial Investigations. He was convicted on March 27, 2006 and sentenced 
to five years’ imprisonment, but the judges refused to implement his 
sentence on the grounds that he was elderly (eighty-five-years-old), did 
not pose a danger to the public, and had to care for his ill wife. The 
mercy shown Dailide (who of course did not show any to his victims), 
reflects the lack of will in Vilnius to hold Lithuanian Nazi war criminals 
accountable, which is a direct outgrowth of the strong opposition to 
dealing with the issue of Lithuanian complicity in Holocaust crimes.15 
It is entirely possible, although it would be extremely difficult to 
prove, that given the growing importance of Holocaust issues in the in-
ternational arena, Lithuania attempted to compensate for its relative 
failure in prosecution by dealing in a more positive manner with some 
of the other, less politically-charged, practical Holocaust–related issues 
listed above, such as commemoration, documentation, and education. It 
is important to note, however, that in these issues as well, there is ample 
room for manipulation and/or distortion of the historical events regard-
ing local complicity. 
The formidable obstacles to the successful prosecution of local 
Holocaust perpetrators in post-Communist societies are not unique to 
Lithuania, which at least can point to four indictments, two convictions, 
and one extradition request, as well as the cancellation of at least 232 
illegal rehabilitations.16 Other countries that faced precisely the same 
 
 15. OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 110. 
 16. According to the figures provided by the Lithuanian authorities to the Wiesenthal Cen-
ter, during the period from April 25, 2005 until April 15, 2016, a total of 232 rehabilitations 
granted to individuals convicted by Soviet courts were cancelled by the Lithuanian Supreme 
Court. There are no exact figures on the number of cancellations in cases related to those who 
collaborated with the Nazis, but Rimvydas Valentukevicius, who served as the Chief Prosecutor 
of the Special Investigations Division which handled these cases, estimated that 95% of those 
whose rehabilitations were cancelled had collaborated with the Nazis. See Rimvydas Valen-
tukevicius’ email to the author, April 25, 2005, in SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER-ISRAEL OFFICE 
ARCHIVES, at Annual Status Report 2005. 
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situation, albeit on a smaller scale, have much less to show for their os-
tensible efforts. 
Thus, for example, Latvia and Estonia also came under interna-
tional pressure to prosecute local Nazi war criminals and both were ex-
tremely reluctant to proceed against their former nationals. In Latvia, 
the case which attracted the most attention (and international pressure) 
was that of former Arajs Kommando lieutenant Konrad Kalejs who, 
among other assignments, was responsible for perimeter security at the 
Salaspils concentration camp near Riga. He had initially escaped to 
Australia, from whence he moved to the United States in the fifties. In 
1994, he was ordered deported from America, in 1998 he was deported 
from Canada and in 2000 he was expelled from Great Britain, in each 
case returning to Melbourne on his Australian passport. Efforts to con-
vince the Latvian authorities to seek his extradition only bore fruit when 
an international conference with representatives from the United States, 
Great Britain, Israel, Australia and Germany was convened in Riga for 
this purpose. The Latvians finally submitted their request to the Austral-
ians in 2000, but Kalejs died in the middle of his appeal against the ex-
tradition.17 
Throughout the entire period in which the Kalejs case was under 
discussion in Latvia, those advocating his prosecution were the object of 
intense criticism, often tinged with anti-Semitism. The themes used by 
those opposed to the prosecution of local Nazi war criminals were simi-
lar to those expressed in Lithuania and often referred to crimes against 
Latvians ostensibly committed by Jewish Communists. Jewish organi-
zations seeking to bring Latvian Nazi war criminals to trial were re-
buked for “ignoring Communist criminals,” among whom, they 
claimed, the percentage of Jews was particularly high.18 
Latvia, like Lithuania, carried out an extensive rehabilitation pro-
gram shortly after obtaining independence. Among those granted par-
dons were numerous members of the Security Police who participated 
in the persecution and murder of Jews, most notably members of the in-
famous Arajs Kommando which played a central role in the mass mur-
ders in and around Riga, in the provincial Latvian Jewish communities, 
and in Belarus. Unlike the situation in Lithuania, where a joint Israeli-
Lithuanian commission of inquiry was established to investigate the is-
sue, a review of the pardons granted was undertaken, and to date more 
than two hundred illegal rehabilitations have already been cancelled, 
there was little willingness in Riga to carry out a similar process. Thus 
 
 17. OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 64–67, 113–14. 
 18. Id. at 118–19. 
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in Latvia there was never a comprehensive review of the rehabilitations 
and only two pardons granted to Latvian Holocaust perpetrators have 
thus far been cancelled.19 
Perhaps the strongest indication of the widespread reluctance to 
properly deal with the issue of Latvian complicity in the Holocaust has 
been the absence of any effort by Latvian officials to combat recurring 
efforts to rehabilitate and/or glorify Herberts Cukurs, the famous pre-
World War II aviator who later became the deputy commander of the 
Arajs Kommando, and to cast doubt on his culpability in the mass mur-
der of Jews and others during the Holocaust. Even respected main-
stream historians, such as Andrew Ezergailis, were sympathetic to the 
attempts to whitewash Cukurs. Thus, for example, he commented that 
there was no evidence that he had been at the pits at Rumbula, the site 
of the mass murder of approximately thirty thousand Latvian Jews, and 
in any event it had not been proven that he was “the most eager shooter 
of Jews in Latvia.” The implication being that less zealous Latvian kill-
ers should not be held accountable for their crimes and even deserved 
rehabilitation.20 
Even worse, when the Jewish community protested against an ex-
hibition on Cukurs entitled “Presumption of Innocence,” the chairman 
of the Saiema’s Foreign Affairs Committee Aleksanders Kirsteins 
warned the Jews of Latvia “not to repeat their perfidious behavior of 
1940.” This charge posits that Latvian Jews welcomed the Soviet occu-
pation in that year, an accusation very popular in nationalist circles, and 
one often used to justify Latvian participation in Holocaust crimes. To 
Latvia’s credit, Kirsteins was removed from his post in the wake of this 
comment.21 
In Estonia as well, there is no political will to prosecute local Nazi 
war criminals. In fact, to date, the Estonians have not initiated a single 
investigation of an Estonian Holocaust perpetrator on their own, nor has 
legal action ever been taken against any local Nazi collaborators. On the 
contrary, Evald Mikson, who served in a prominent position in the noto-
rious Political Police in Tallinn, was defended by the Estonian Foreign 
Ministry, which issued a statement proclaiming his innocence, after al-
legations concerning his involvement in the persecution and murder of 
Jews and Communists surfaced in 1991.22 Other cases dragged on for 
 
 19. Id. at 114–15. 
 20. Gunita Nagle and Nora Drike, Nav tiesāts, tomēr navari nevainigs, DIENA, May 17, 
2005. 
 21. OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 118–19. 
 22. On Mikson’s crimes, see the testimony of Hilka Mootse, June 12, 1961, criminal case 
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years with no concrete results, despite the existence of abundant evi-
dence proving the guilt of the suspects. Thus expatriate multimillionaire 
and cultural patron Harry Mannil was spared prosecution for his role in 
the Estonian Political Police, and Gestapo operative Michael 
Gorschkow, who was involved in the murder of Jews in Slutzk, Belarus, 
was never brought to justice in Estonia.23 
Other allegations were dismissed without any serious investiga-
tion. Thus, for example, in July 2002, the Simon Wiesenthal Center 
submitted the names of 16 members of the Thirty-Sixth Estonian Police 
Battalion, who were decorated in December 1942 for their service with 
the Nazis, to the Estonian Security Police Board as possible suspects in 
the murder of the Jews of Nowogrudok, Belarus on 7 August 1942. The 
Security Police Board announced approximately two weeks later that 
there was no evidence to link the unit to the murder of the Jews of 
Nowogrudok, despite the fact that its participation in this crime was es-
tablished by the Estonian “International Commission for Investigation 
of Crimes against Humanity” and confirmed by survivor witnesses.24 
A clear-cut indication that the efforts to prosecute Estonian Nazi 
war criminals did not change local perceptions regarding the Holocaust 
was the August 2002 public opinion poll published in the daily Eesti 
Paevaleht which asked Estonians whether they supported the establish-
ment of a special memorial day for the victims of the Holocaust, which 
by this time was a fairly common practice in Europe. Ninety-three per-
cent of the respondents disapproved and only seven percent supported 
such an initiative.25 
In both these Baltic countries, the efforts to facilitate prosecution 
encountered formidable political obstacles, which are clearly reflected 
by a comparison of the number of Communist criminals prosecuted 
compared to the number of Holocaust perpetrators brought to justice. 
Already a decade ago, ten Communist criminals had been put on trial in 
Estonia, and seven in Latvia, compared to zero suspected Nazi war 
criminals. (During the same time period, seventeen persons were tried 
for Communist crimes in Lithuania, and an additional nineteen were put 
 
15-61, former KGB Archives, Tallinn, Estonia. She witnessed him rape a Jewish mother and her 
daughter in the Vonnu rural district while he led the local Omakaitse, a nationalist vigilante 
squad. 
 23. On the Mannil case, see OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 126–29; on the 
Gorschkow case see Federal Court Revokes U.S. Citizenship of Former Gestapo Interrogator 
Who Participated in Nazi Mass Murder, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, July 31, 2002, 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/July/02_crm_446.htm. 
 24. OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 128. 
 25. Id. at 128. 
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on trial after 2006).26 
In each country, the demands by Jewish organizations to prosecute 
Holocaust perpetrators encountered vociferous opposition which was 
exacerbated by the local media, most of which actively opposed their 
initiatives, in a manner which bordered on the anti-Semitic. Thus, for 
example, Eesti Ekspress, the most popular Estonian news weekly, pub-
lished a caricature of an official of the Wiesenthal Center (in fact, the 
author of this article), who presented the evidence against Harry Mannil 
to Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar, as a devil intent on collecting the 
blood of the suspect, under the caption “Unwanted guest.”27 Responses 
on the Internet to news stories regarding these cases or interviews with 
the individuals involved, invariably elicited harsh responses, often fo-
cusing on the alleged crimes of Jewish Communists against Balts, and 
even on occasion included calls for violence against those Jews pressing 
for the prosecution of local Nazi war criminals. 
Besides Lithuania, Nazi war criminals were prosecuted in only two 
other Eastern European post-Communist countries—Croatia and Hun-
gary. The former conducted what can today be described as the most 
successful trial of a Nazi collaborator in democratic Eastern Europe and 
in fact the only legal proceeding which resulted in the punishment of the 
defendant. The case in question was that of Jasenovac commander 
Dinko Šakić, who in 1999 was convicted in Zagreb of responsibility for 
the murder of more than two thousand inmates and sentenced to the 
maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. 
In the wake of that conviction, several positive steps were taken to 
combat attempts to whitewash Ustasha crimes by nationalist right-wing 
elements. Thus, for example, a central square in Zagreb which after 
World War II had been named for the “Victims of Fascism,” but whose 
name was changed when Croatia became independent to “Heroes of 
Croatia,” had its original name restored. A street in the city of Split 
named after the breakup of Yugoslavia in honor of Ustasha Education 
Minister Mile Budak was renamed in the wake of a protest campaign. 
An annual memorial mass held in Zagreb to honor Ustasha leader Ante 
Pavelic was cancelled, and two monuments to famous Ustasha heroes—
Budak and Jure Francitec were destroyed by the government.28 
The conviction of Šakić was not the only positive step taken by the 
 
 26. EVA-CLARITA PETTAI AND VELLO PETTAI, TRANSITIONAL AND RETROSPECTIVE 
JUSTICE IN THE BALTIC STATES 84–85 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
 27. Aet Suvari and Pekka Erelt, Kutsumata kulaline, EESTI EKSPRESS, August 23, 2001, at 
5. 
 28. OPERATION LAST CHANCE, supra note 1, at 143–49. 
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Croatians. They also extradited Šakić’s wife Nada who had served at 
the Stara Gradiška women’s camp and issued an international arrest 
warrant for escaped Požega (Croatia) police chief Milivoj Ašner, who 
was responsible for the deportations to concentration camps of several 
hundred innocent civilians. These steps did not result in prosecutions, 
however, since Nada Šakić became ill and the Austrians refused to ex-
tradite Ašner to stand trial in Croatia.29 
Hungary, like Croatia, conducted a trial of a Nazi collaborator, and 
sought the extradition of at least one Nazi war criminal, but it did not 
register any practical successes. Hungarian gendarmerie officer Sandor 
Kepiro, who was accused of participation in the murder of Serbs, Jews, 
and Roma in and around the city of Novi Sad in January 1942, was ac-
quitted by a Budapest court and died before the government’s appeal 
could be heard.30 A Hungarian request for the extradition of Karoly 
(Charles) Zentai for the murder of eighteen-year-old Peter Babazs 
whom he caught on a streetcar without the requisite yellow star, was re-
jected by the Australian High Court.31 
In attempting to assess the positive impact of the Šakić trial as op-
posed to the ostensibly less impressive practical results achieved by the 
efforts to prosecute local Nazi war criminals in the Baltics, one can 
point to several key factors: 
First, the prominence of the suspects and their specific crimes 
played an important role. As the last surviving unprosecuted concentra-
tion camp commander, who was in charge of the most notorious Usta-
sha concentration camp, and an individual who had personally commit-
ted murder, Šakić was a criminal whose crimes could not be ignored. In 
contrast, while the role played by Saugumas commanders Lileikis and 
Gimzauskas was unquestionably criminal and worthy of prosecution, 
the fact that they were essentially desk murderers made it harder to con-
vince public opinion, in what was largely a political decision, that they 
had to be held accountable for their crimes. Had there been unequivocal 
evidence, including live witnesses, that they had personally committed 
murder—and the same applies for all the other cases in the Baltics—it 
most probably would have been easier to convince these countries to 
prosecute the suspects. 
A second important factor in the relative success of the Šakić trial 
was the existence of strong local support for his prosecution by signifi-
cant segments of Croatian society. This was primarily due to two rea-
 
 29. For more on the Ašner case, see id. at 1–11. 
 30. For more on the Kepiro trial, see id. at 209–19. 
 31. For more on the Zentai Case, see id. at 173–82. 
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sons. The first was that unlike the situation in the Baltics, many Croa-
tians had opposed, and even fought against, the Ustasha and thus there 
was an important part of society with a strong anti-fascist orientation. 
While they did not necessarily constitute a clear majority of the popula-
tion, they were an element which could not be ignored and they openly 
expressed their support for the prosecution. There was no such equiva-
lent in any of the Baltic countries, a factor which made it easy for the 
governments of these countries to ignore their legal responsibility. The 
other factor of importance relates to the identity of the victims. Whereas 
those murdered in the Baltics were overwhelmingly Jews, the victims at 
Jasenovac were primarily non-Jews, specifically Serbs, Gypsies, and an-
ti-fascist Croatians. This fact most likely increased the number of local 
supporters of the prosecution. 
A third factor which helps explain the difference between Croatia 
and the Baltics is the attitude of the local media. As noted above, the 
Baltic media reflected the widespread empathy for the defendants and 
viewed the efforts to prosecute them as sinister and rooted in anti-Baltic 
prejudice. Still preoccupied with their own suffering under Soviet occu-
pation, most of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian press felt obligat-
ed to defend their own nationals from the attacks of foreign Jewish or-
ganizations, Israel and the United States rather than admit the 
complicity of local Nazi collaborators in Holocaust crimes. 
I believe that we will soon be able to assess the full impact of the 
efforts to prosecute Nazi war criminals in post-Communist Central and 
Eastern Europe. It is already clear, however, that the major obstacles to 
successful prosecutions were not necessarily technical issues concerning 
evidence and the advanced age of defendants and/or witnesses, but ra-
ther deep-rooted factors which will take many decades of education to 
overcome. 
 
